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Like most of those subjected to the capitalist mode of power, Toro Molina, the protagonist of Budd Schul-
berg’s novel The Harder They Fall (1947), knows nothing about the larger scheme of things. Lured to 
the U.S. on a promise to ‘financialize’ his huge muscles, the Argentine-villager-turned-U.S.-boxing-cham-
pion will see none of the yield on his ‘human capital’. His promoters will take it all. They will ‘fix’ his 
battles into a winning streak to capitalize his victories as he fights his way to the West Coast – and then 
leverage his serialized losses as he makes his way back to the East. The harder he falls, the higher they rise. 
 
1. From boom to doom 
 
Until a few months ago, the stock market narrative in the United States could have been sum-
marized by the popular acronym BTFD – or ‘buy the fucking dip’. Analysts and strategists, 
emboldened by the world’s synchronized recovery, Trump’s pro-business policies and ample 
liquidity, predicted that equities would continue rising and recommended that investors take advantage of any 
temporary weakness to augment their stock 
holdings in anticipation of further upside. 
But the atmosphere of boom has since 
given way to doom and gloom. With equity 
markets having entered ‘correction’ territory, 
many observers, including some of the 
world’s richest investors, now warn of a com-
ing crash and a protracted ‘bear market’.  
 
2. EPS: the stylized facts 
 
Figure 1 sets this shifting sentiment in a long-
term context. The chart, which begins in the 
early 1970s, shows the annual growth rates of 
U.S. and global earnings per share (EPS), 
smoothed as 12-month trailing averages, (in 
this piece, we use the terms ‘earnings’ and 
‘profits’ interchangeably).  
The historical pattern of both series is 
highly stylized and very similar. In both 
cases, EPS growth is cyclical, mean-reverting 
and oscillating within clear bounds. Although 
there are some glaring exceptions, in general 
earnings growth rates tend to peak at around 
+25% and trough at around -10% (a more pe-
dantic plot showing the series’ historical 
means ± one standard deviation would con-
vey the same pattern only with more clutter).  
                           
                
                  
                                                                                           
                                                             
                   
     
                
  
                
   
   
   
   
   
   











                                            
   
   
   
   
   
   












3. Has earnings growth peaked? 
 
According to the data, current EPS growth rates hover around their upper historical bound: the U.S. rate is just 
shy of +25% (circled in green), while the global rate (including the U.S.) is already down from its +20% peak.  
It is of course possible for both U.S. and world EPS to continue rising at somewhat lower rates – as they 
did, for example, during the late 1990s and mid-2000s. But based on the historical record, the likelihood of a 
sharp downward reversal from these elevated levels seems high – particularly given mounting indications of a 
global slowdown.  
 
4. Why should falling earnings matter for the stock market? 
 
To the uninitiated, the answer might seem obvious: stock prices discount corporate earnings, meaning that when 
earnings decelerate or drop – all else remaining the same – so must equity prices.  
Or must they? 
Note that Figure 1 depicts the growth of current EPS (accrued over the past 12 months). In theory, though, 
stocks should capitalize not current earnings, but future earnings, and not future earnings in the abstract, but 
future earnings all the way to eternity (Benjamin Graham, quoted in Zweig 2009: 28). 
Now, it is true that, due to discounting, the deeper we delve into the future, the lower the capitalized value 
of any given dollar of earnings. But since according to the theorists of finance the future is potentially infinite, 
discounted future dollars add up and eventually overwhelm the magnitude of current ones. 
So, in principle, current earnings should not really matter for stock prices. And, indeed, very often they don’t.  
 
5. The price-EPS correlation: a brief history 
 
Figure 2 is updated from our RWER paper ‘A 
CasP Model of the Stock Market’ (Bichler 
and Nitzan 2016: Figure 9, p. 141). The blue 
dotted series depicts the 12-month trailing 
Pearson Correlation coefficient between the 
monthly S&P 500 stock price index and cur-
rent EPS, with the trailing correlation itself 
then smoothed as a 10-year trailing average.  
As the chart shows, this correlation has 
changed dramatically over time, tracing a 
somewhat ragged V-shape pattern. During 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, the price-EPS correlation was high, hov-
ering around +0.4. But from then on, it 
trended downward, and by the late 1970s it 
even turned negative.  
In other words, during much of the twen-
tieth century, current earnings became de-
creasingly important and eventually irrele-
vant for stock prices – exactly as the standard 
manuals of finance stipulate. 
But in the early 1990s the downtrend sud-
denly reversed. The price-EPS correlation 
started to rise, and by the early 2010s reached 
record levels, in excess of +0.6. Unlike the 
previous downtrend, this upward trajectory is inconsistent with the canons of finance.   
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6. Systemic fear and capitalized power 
 
What does the price-EPS correlation mean, and why has it changed so dramatically over time?  
In our work, we answered the first question by proposing to view the price-EPS correlation as a quantitative 
proxy for the systemic fear of capitalists (Nitzan and Bichler 2009b; Bichler and Nitzan 2010; Kliman, Bichler, 
and Nitzan 2011; Bichler and Nitzan 2016, 2018; for a critique, see Baines and Hager 2019).  
Stated briefly, our logic runs as follows. When capitalists are optimistic about the long-term future of their 
system – i.e., when they think that the flow of profit will continue indefinitely – there is no reason for them to pay 
much attention to current earnings. In this ‘business as usual’ scenario, with capitalists abiding by their sacred 
forward-looking ritual of capitalization, equity prices reflect long-term profit expectations (as well as other fac-
tors, such as risk and the discount rate) and are impacted only marginally or not at all by profits that are earned 
here and now. The result is a low or even negative price-EPS correlation, as witnessed for example during the 
1970s and 1980s. 
By contrast, when capitalists become apprehensive about the long-term prospect of their system – in other 
words, when they are struck by systemic fear – they grow uncertain about and have difficulty envisioning the 
future flow of profit. This deep incertitude forces them to abandon their forward-looking ritual and instead cap-
italize stocks based on what they can be certain of here and now – that is, on current profit. The result is a high 
price-EPS correlation, as witnessed for instance since the early 2000s.1 
Now why did our ‘systemic fear index’ decline during much of the twentieth century, only to reverse course 
and rise sharply since the 1990s? The answer, we suggest, has to do with the solid black series shown in Figure 2. 
This series measures the ratio between the S&P 500 price index and the U.S. average wage rate, and we label it 
the power index.  
Capitalist power, we claim, gets capitalized differentially – that is, by weighing the value of one’s assets or 
income relative to those of others (Nitzan 1992, 1998; Nitzan and Bichler 2009a). In this case, where our focus 
is on the broad power of capitalists relative to workers, a simple power index can be calculated by comparing 
stock prices to wages.  
The remarkable – and perplexing – thing about our power and systemic fear indices is that they are so tightly 
and systematically correlated: over the past century and half, their Pearson Correlation measures +0.84 out of a 
maximum of 1. And the question is why.  
Why should the ups and down of the price-EPS correlation bear any relationship to the gyrations of the 
stock price/wage ratio? Indeed, assuming our labelling of the two series is valid, why should the systemic fear 
of capitalists oscillate together with their differential power? If anything, shouldn’t they move inversely to one 
another? 
 
7. The dialectics of power and fear 
 
As far as we know, this question has never been posed before, let alone answered. Indeed, to the best of our 
knowledge, the underlying series themselves haven’t been constructed and plotted before – and certainly not as 
proxies for capitalized power and systemic fear. So our answer here can only be tentative.  
According to Hobbes’ Leviathan (1691, first published in 1651), the relatively equal abilities of human beings 
breed their uncertainty, insecurity and mutual suspicion, and these forces in turn compel them to try to increase 
their differential power without end. But then – and this is the crucial qualifier – the more power one possesses, 
the more one dreads losing it all. The result is an ongoing cycle, with fear stoking a hunger for power, and the 
amassment of power heightening the very fear that begot that hunger in the first place (for example, pp. 75 and 
94). 
                                                          
1 The high price-EPS correlation of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was associated, at least in part, with the 
fact that forward-looking capitalization was only beginning to gain traction in the equity market, and that its birth pangs 
elicited plenty of uncertainty about and mistrust of future earnings projections. ‘The principle that capitalization should be 
based on [future] earning capacity rather than on actual cost’, declared one disgruntled observer, ‘is not only unsound in 
theory but is also vicious in its practical application’ (Bonbright 1921: 482). For more, see Nitzan and Bichler (2009a: 155-
158). 
4 
And if our interpretation here is correct, this is exactly what we see in Figure 2. The greater the power of 
capitalists relative to workers (i.e., the higher the ratio of stock prices to wages in the chart), the more difficult it 
will be to increase this power further in the future, and therefore the greater the capitalists’ systemic fear that 
their relative capitalization will decelerate or stall. In this sense, the greater the capitalized power the direr its 
potential investment consequences. As differential power continues to increase against mounting opposition, 
there is a growing risk that this power will be openly challenged and scaled back (through reform and downward 
redistribution); and if despite these counter-developments capitalized power continues to climb, there arises the 
possibility – remote as it may be – of capitalized power being overthrown altogether (revolution). For capitalists, 
then, capitalized power and systemic fear go hand in hand: the greater (lesser) the power, the greater (lesser) the 
systemic fear of losing it.  
Now, the impact of growing fear – and this is a key point – is largely introverted, at least initially: it affects 
not the level of capitalization, but its temporal basis. When capitalized power is low (like it was, for instance, 
during the 1970s and 1980s), capitalization relies on and reflects forward-looking earnings expectations (hence 
the low or even negative price-EPS correlation). But as capitalized power grows (as it has, for example, since 
the 1990s), capitalists, apprehensive about mounting systemic risks, gradually shift their gaze from the deep 
future to the most recent past (causing the price-EPS correlation to rise).  
 
8. The harder they fall 
 
With this framework in mind, the question of peak earnings becomes crucial. According to Figure 2, the dialec-
tical twins of capitalized power and systemic fear are currently at record highs, which means that the stock 
market trajectory is now highly dependent on the direction of current profits. And given that according to Fig-
ure 1 U.S. and world earnings growth are also near record highs, it seems likely that the U.S. rate will soon flip 
(as the global one already has), and that when it does, the U.S. stock market, being ultra-sensitive to current 
earnings, will follow suit.  
The anticipation of this outcome 
is revealed, and rather dramatically, 
by Figure 3. The chart, currently pop-
ular among financial fear mongers, 
juxtaposes the S&P 500 price against 
the so-called ‘smart money index’. 
The divergence between the directions 
of the two series proxies the relative 
bullishness/bearishness of sophisti-
cated investors (hence the term 
‘smart money’). When sophisticated 
investors are bullish, they ‘buy into 
weakness’, causing the smart money 
index to fall by less (or rise by more) 
than the S&P price. And when they 
are bearish, they do the opposite – 
namely, they ‘sell into strength, thus 
causing the smart market index to 
rise by less (or fall by more) than the 
S&P 500 price.  
Based on this arithmetic, the 
huge drop in the smart money index 
since early 2018 against the backdrop 
of a rising S&P 500 price suggests 
that sophisticated investors have 
grown extremely pessimistic. 
                                            
     
         
     
                  
                                                                                                    
                                                                    
            
      
           
     










   
   
   
   
   
   





   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
5 
All in all, then, it seems that the road for another major bear market, with roller-coaster consequences for 
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